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Original Article
In December 2017, the US Supreme Court heard arguments 
in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, a case that centers on a wedding cake baker 
who refused to make a cake for a same-sex couple. The case 
is one example of debates occurring across the country over 
tensions between religious freedom and LGBTQ (lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer) rights. In the wake of 
marriage equality for same-sex couples, many states have 
introduced and passed laws that provide “religious 
exemptions” for certain services and benefits for LGBTQ1 
persons. These laws allow individuals to make decisions in 
their work environments that may violate civil rights laws 
but that uphold their religious conviction that fundamentally 
opposes nonheterosexual relationships and transgender iden-
tities. Although wedding-related services (such as wedding 
cakes) have garnered the most media attention, the bills pro-
vide protection for religious exceptions in a wide range of 
services. For instance, in Mississippi, mental health care 
providers can refuse to treat LGBTQ people. In South 
Dakota, North Dakota, and Michigan, employees in adoption 
and foster care services can legally refuse to place children 
with LGBTQ parents. In the first half of 2017, 93 anti-LGBT 
bills were debated, 42 of which were religious exemption 
laws, and 60 pro-LGBT bills were debated (American Civil 
Liberties Union 2017).2 The prevalence of both religious 
freedom bills and laws protecting LGBTQ people following 
marriage equality underscores that these laws expose 
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Abstract
In the wake of marriage equality for same-sex couples, many states have introduced and passed laws that provide 
religious exemptions for certain services and benefits for LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer) 
persons. The authors use data from a general population survey of Nebraskans as a mixed-methods case study to 
examine public opinion of religious freedom laws. Drawing on data from both closed-ended (n = 1,117) and open-
ended (n = 838) questions, the authors show that opposition to religious freedom laws is quite high, as 64 percent 
of respondents report that they oppose laws that would allow business owners to deny services to gay men and 
lesbians. The authors outline how both sides rely on frameworks that are foundational to the American experience: 
the protection of rights and the capitalist economy. The authors argue that these appeals to broad American values 
underscore why these bills will continue to be introduced and seen as controversial despite low levels of support.
Keywords
public opinion, sexuality, LGBT rights, religious freedom
1We use the term LGBTQ when discussing religious freedom legis-
lation to reflect the fact that these bills affect a range of nonhetero-
sexual or nonbinary individuals. Given that the question from the 
survey data we analyze refers to “gay men or lesbians,” we use the 
phrase “gay men and lesbians” when discussing our findings.
2The American Civil Liberties Union defines pro-LGBT bills as 
legislation that offers comprehensive or incomplete protection 
from discrimination for sexual orientation and/or gender identity. It 
identifies anti-LGBT bills as antitransgender (regulating single-sex 
facility restrooms, identification documents, health care, and other); 
First Amendment defense acts; religious freedom restoration acts; 
religious exemptions related to health care access, adoption and 
foster care, marriage-related exemptions, and other; and preventive 
measures against nondiscrimination protection for LGBTQ people.
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contemporary debates over freedom, as gay rights and reli-
gious rights are pitted against each other.
Public opinion polling about religious freedom laws, how-
ever, is limited. National surveys have found that the public is 
more closely divided on religious freedom laws than current 
public opinion about same-sex marriage, which is largely 
affirming (McCarthy 2014, 2016, 2017; Silver 2013). 
According to the Pew Research Center (2016a, 2016d), 
Americans are less likely to oppose a same-sex couple’s right 
to marry (37 percent) than to support laws that allow busi-
nesses to refuse to provide wedding-related services to same-
sex couples (48 percent) or that require transgender people to 
use the public restroom that aligns with the gender they were 
assigned at birth (46 percent). Data from a national survey 
experiment further underscore the division, with 53 percent 
supporting denial of services to a hypothetical gay couple 
seeking wedding photography (Powell, Schnabel, and Apgar 
2017). Missing from these data is an explanation of why indi-
viduals support or oppose religious freedom legislation.
In this study, we use data from a general population sur-
vey of Nebraskans as a mixed-methods case study to exam-
ine public opinion of religious freedom laws that directly 
reference sexual minorities. We first analyze the percentages 
of respondents who favored and opposed religious freedom 
laws and how support for religious freedom laws differs 
across demographic, political, and religious groups. We then 
analyze respondents’ written explanations of why they favor 
or oppose the rights of business owners to refuse service to 
gay men and lesbians. Analysis of the open-ended survey 
responses reveals that individual attitudes about religious 
freedom issues do not neatly map onto past findings about 
people’s attitudes toward same-sex sexuality or same-sex 
marriage. Instead, individuals on both sides of the religious 
freedom issue draw on similar logics to support their clash-
ing views. On the basis of analysis of more than 800 open-
ended responses, we find that respondents rely on similar 
logics to justify their opinions: individual rights and the free 
market. These frameworks are overlapping and represent 
shared representations of American identity (Blair-Loy 2001; 
Bonikowski 2017; Brubaker 2004). Yet they reveal how 
respondents connect opposite viewpoints to widely shared 
values and how religious freedom debates gain so much trac-
tion and tension in contemporary American politics.
Cultural Schemas: Rights and Free 
Market
To analyze how people make sense of religious freedom laws 
related to LGBTQ individuals, we draw on insights from cul-
tural sociology that underscores the importance of shared 
meaning and frameworks in social life (Hays 2000; Sewell 
1999; Swidler 1986). In particular, we are interested in the 
“cultural schemas” that guide how people respond to the 
hypothetical scenario of a business owner serving (or not 
serving) a gay or lesbian customer (Di Maggio 1997; Sewell 
2001). Cultural schemas refer to the “socially constructed 
frameworks,” “shared, publicly available understandings” 
(Blair-Loy 2001:689), or “overarching shared representations 
of particular domains of social life” (Bonikowski 2017:9). 
These schemas help organize information coherently and 
guide interpretations and action. In this way, analyzing how 
people explain their support for or opposition to religious 
freedom legislation sheds lights on the cultural schemas sur-
rounding some of the most salient values in contemporary 
America: freedom, rights, capitalism, and diversity.
As we will describe, public support for the protection of 
Christian business owners who refuse service to gays and 
lesbians implicitly or explicitly rejects the notion that 
inequalities related to sexual orientation (heterosexuality 
privileged over nonheterosexuality) or religion (Christianity 
privileged over secularism or other religions) are embedded 
within American democracy. Yet importantly, scholars argue 
that issues of power and inequality penetrate social ideolo-
gies, or “common sense,” that reflect only a dominant group’s 
perspective (Bonilla Silva 2006; Duggan 2004; Levitsky 
2014). For instance, scholars argue that the shared frame-
work of the American dream and meritocracy masks how 
class, race, and gender inequalities shape people’s opportuni-
ties (McNamee and Miller 2009). When making sense of 
diversity, another cultural schema, Americans frame an indi-
vidual’s unique identity as a positive aspect of a diverse soci-
ety but downplay or disparage group-level differences, such 
as those that harm communities of color and privilege major-
ity-white communities (Bell and Hartmann 2007). A related 
example is how many Americans, including some people of 
color, share a “color-blind” understanding about race that is 
based on white supremacy (Bonilla-Silva 2006). Identity 
markers including race (white), religion (Christian), and sex-
uality (heterosexual) are salient in representations of who is 
and is not American (Canaday 2009; Parker and Barreto 
2013; Theiss-Morse 2009). Debates over religious freedom 
laws directed toward gays and lesbians highlight current ten-
sions related to whose freedom and rights should be pro-
tected, who is and is not in danger of being harmed, and how 
best to remedy potential harms people may experience.
Our findings suggest that values related to “rights” and 
the free market are the most salient shared frameworks or 
schemas on both sides of this religious freedom debate. The 
framework of rights is widespread in American public dis-
course, and the belief in the importance of rights is univer-
sally shared (Djupe et al., 2015). As people draw on rights 
language, they make claims about how they and others 
deserve to be treated in the public sphere (Harrington and 
Yngvesson 1990; Jenness 1999; Minow 1987). Americans 
assert the importance of both individual and group rights that 
emerge from the Constitution yet can see these rights in ten-
sion with one another (Bumiller 1992; Scheingold 2004). 
The shared framework or cultural schema of “rights” is so 
salient in America that an appeal to “rights” is envisioned as 
an appeal to a better society (Scheingold 2004). For instance, 
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the civil rights movement advocated that all Americans, 
including people of color, have the right to be free from dis-
crimination, a framework that activists have worked to 
extend to other groups, including gay and lesbians (Bernstein 
2003; Skrentny 2002). Yet the use of “rights” is undertaken 
by both political liberals and conservatives to bolster posi-
tions on a range of issues, including school choice, gun con-
trol, and abortion (Garnett and Garnett 2000; Jelen 2005; 
Luker 1985). Indeed, conservatives opposed to the expan-
sion of LGBTQ rights have argued that these are “special 
rights” gays and lesbians do not deserve (Goldberg-Hiller 
and Milner 2003; Stein 2001; Stone 2016).
Additionally, scholars note that neoliberal understandings 
increasingly infuse how Americans make sense of social life, 
including the views that the “free market” is paramount, and 
government intervention should be limited (Amable 2011; 
Brown 2006; Harvey 2005). Neoliberalism is, in the words 
of Lisa Duggan (2004:10), “a kind of ‘nonpolitics’”: an ide-
ology that promotes what are assumed to be universal values 
related to the spread of capitalism and the increase of wealth 
across the globe. When applied to cultural issues, neoliberal 
values minimize public demand for protective government 
policies and instead privatize the role of social welfare, plac-
ing the burden on individuals and families (see also Levitsky 
2014). Before turning to our analyses of how the cultural 
schemas of “rights” and “free market” emerge as people 
make sense of business owners’ serving gay and lesbian cus-
tomers, we briefly outline the history of religious freedom 
legislation and the current context of religious freedom leg-
islation related to LGBTQ rights.
Legislating Religious Freedom
Since Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA) in 1993, 25 states have enacted similar religious 
freedom laws. Debates over many of the earliest religious 
freedom laws included no mention of same-sex wedding 
cakes. The RFRA was initially passed to overturn a Supreme 
Court ruling (Employment Division v. Smith 1990) that deter-
mined that Native American employees did not have the con-
stitutional right to smoke peyote as part of a religious 
ceremony. The organizations originally supporting the pas-
sage of the RFRA included the American Civil Liberties 
Union and moderate religious groups such as the American 
Jewish Committee and the United Methodist Church 
(Hamilton 2015). Many of the initial supporters of the RFRA 
likely did not anticipate its effects. These include, according 
to legal scholar Margaret Hamilton (2015:140), that religious 
persons have “a significantly higher likelihood of success” 
when claiming religious grounds for actions that may violate 
the law.
The conflict over religious freedom and civil rights in the 
workplace is not unique to LGBT politics. The federal Civil 
Rights Act requires that employers accommodate religious 
exemption requests as long as these requests do not cause 
“undue hardship” on employers. Definitions of “religious 
freedom,” however, remain murky because “undue hard-
ship” is a subjective measure. Recent court cases have 
included a Muslim flight attendant who wishes to be exempt 
from serving alcohol; postal workers who refused to process 
draft registration forms on the grounds of religious pacifism; 
and Christian nurses who refuse to wash instruments to pre-
pare for abortion procedures (Volokh 2015). Historically, 
religious groups attempted and failed to be exempt from laws 
that prohibit racial discrimination (Minow 2007; Turley 
2008). Bob Jones University, for example, lost its tax-exempt 
status when it continued to prohibit interracial marriages 
after Loving v. Virginia rejected this prohibition in 1967. 
Religious groups have received some exemptions when it 
comes to laws protecting gender discrimination. For exam-
ple, if an unmarried female employee signs a declaration of 
faith with a religious employer, she can be legally terminated 
from employment if she becomes pregnant (Minow 2007).
Religious freedom laws offer a strategy in the current 
moment for religious conservative political actors concerned 
that the advancement of LGBTQ rights infringes on the rights 
of religious conservatives (Corvino, Anderson, and Girgis 
2017). Even though the U.S. Constitution explicitly protects 
the freedom of religious expression, and most states do not 
offer protection for LGBTQ rights (such as from housing or 
employment discrimination), the RFRA and related state bills 
provide a practical route by which individuals can use the 
courts to make free exercise violation claims against the state 
(Bridge 2014; Richardson 2015).3 One such law is Mississippi 
House Bill 1523 (passed in April 2016 and implemented in 
October 2017 after a series of court appeals), which protects 
persons who have “the sincerely held religious belief” that 
marriage “should be recognized as the union of one man and 
one woman” to decide whether to provide services, including 
housing and employment, to LGBTQ people. The law does 
not protect religious freedom generally but specifically draws 
from conservative Protestant beliefs to put forth specific reg-
ulations surrounding gender and sexuality. It defines, for 
example, “a man” and “a woman,” according to law: “an indi-
vidual’s immutable biological sex as objectively determined 
by anatomy and genetics at the time of birth.” Although the 
RFRA as it was first enacted garnered a wide range of support 
from liberal and conservative organizations alike, recent reli-
gious freedom legislation is explicitly a compendium to an 
anti-LGBTQ and antiabortion political agenda connected to 
the religious right (Hamilton 2015).
It has yet to be determined whether these refusals of ser-
vices would be upheld in court, even if they may be pro-
tected by state law. State legislatures along with courts must 
determine whether LGBT nondiscrimination laws must 
3As of June 2017, there are 28 states with no employment or hous-
ing nondiscrimination laws covering sexual orientation or gender 
identity (Movement Advancement Project 2017).
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offer religious exemptions and what those exemptions might 
be. Legal scholars on both sides agree that any outcome sig-
nals the state’s moral position about gay and lesbian citizen-
ship (Dent 2006; Feldblum 2008; Minow 2007). 
Nondiscrimination laws signal that to not protect gays and 
lesbians is morally wrong. Religious exemptions to these 
laws, however, signal that the exclusion of gays and lesbians 
is morally permissible. As Feldblum (2008) describes, “an 
inevitable choice between liberties must come into play” 
(p. 153). Although legal scholars have proposed various 
solutions to this dilemma (see Dent 2006; Feldblum 2008; 
Turley 2008; Wilson 2017) popular debates highlight only 
this either/or position: protection of gays and lesbians at the 
expense of religious conservatives or the protection of reli-
gious conservatives at the expense of gays and lesbians.
LGBTQ Rights in a Postmarriage 
Context
Analyzing public opinion about legal protection for business 
owners who refuse service to gay men and lesbians is also 
instructive of how Americans make sense of LGBTQ rights. 
Polling agencies and researchers have tracked Americans’ atti-
tudes of laws and policies affecting LGBTQ individuals and 
have shown large shifts in public opinion during the previous 
decades. Across public opinion polls today, more Americans 
support same-sex marriage than oppose it (McCarthy 2014, 
2016, 2017; Pew Research Center 2014; Silver 2013). 
Researchers have also found high levels of support for laws 
protecting LGBTQ people from housing and job discrimina-
tion (Lax and Phillips 2009; Lewis and Rogers 1999; Powell 
et al. 2010). Consistently, research shows that women, higher 
educated people, nonreligious individuals, younger genera-
tions, and political liberals are more likely to support these 
pro-LGBTQ policies than men, lower educated people, reli-
gious individuals, older generations, and political conserva-
tives (Brumbaugh et al. 2008; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; 
Lewis 2011; Lewis and Gossett 2008; Olson, Cadge, and 
Harrison 2006; Pearl and Galupo 2007; Rowatt et al. 2009; 
Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek 2010; Swank, Woodford, and 
Lim 2013; Whitehead 2010; Woodford et al. 2012).
Recent polls have found that Americans are divided over 
the issues legislated by recent religious freedom bills depend-
ing on how the question is asked (Pew Research Center 
2016d; Powell et al. 2017; Rasmussen 2015). Data from the 
Pew Research Center (2016d) show that 52.32 percent of 
respondents think that businesses providing wedding related 
services, such as catering or flowers, should be allowed to 
refuses services to same-sex couples. A similar number of 
people (53 percent) surveyed in a national experimental sur-
vey reported that a photographer should have the right to 
deny a same-sex couple’s request for wedding photography 
(Powell et al. 2017). Yet a 2017 survey conducted by the 
Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI; Cox and Jones 
2017) found that only 32 percent of Americans believe that 
small businesses should be able to refuse to provide services 
to gay and lesbian people on religious grounds. Another 
national survey found that 65.5 percent of respondents sup-
ported “some religious freedom laws to protect individuals 
with legitimate religious beliefs” but that 63 percent of those 
respondents also agreed that “sometimes states do pass laws 
designed to discriminate” (Jackson State University 2016). 
Our work adds to the limited public opinion data on religious 
freedom laws that reference sexual minorities and enriches 
our understanding about how people justify their support or 
opposition to these laws.
Nebraska: A Case Study
Although we do not claim our data are nationally generaliz-
able, characteristics of Nebraska make our data instructive 
for how Americans make sense of debates over religious 
freedom legislation. First, although Nebraska is more politi-
cally conservative than the national average, the state is com-
parable with the rest of the nation when it comes to attitudes 
about LGBTQ rights. Nebraska voters overwhelmingly sup-
ported a ban on same-sex marriage in a 2000 referendum 
(Adam 2003; Rasmussen 2006), and the Republican Party, 
which largely controls the state government, continues to 
advocate for defining marriage as the union between one 
man and one woman. Yet in the decade that followed the ban 
on same-sex marriage, the flagship state university and some 
school districts, hospitals, business, and city and county gov-
ernments extended benefits to same-sex couples (Dejka 
2013; Funk 2013; Glissmann 2013; Reed 2012). Moreover, 
recent analyses indicate that the majority of Nebraskans sup-
port same-sex marriage and other LGBTQ rights and that 
Nebraskans’ opinions mirror national public opinion on these 
issues (Stange and Kazyak 2016).
Additionally, Nebraska is fairly average when it comes to 
measures of religiosity. A Pew Research Center (2014) study 
ranks it the 22nd most religious state, on the basis of the per-
centage of residents who say that religion is very important in 
their lives (54 percent), that they attend worship services 
weekly (39 percent), that they pray daily (52 percent), and 
that they believe in God with certainty (69 percent). It is nei-
ther highly religious like states in the South (Mississippi and 
Alabama are tied for the most religious) nor highly secular 
like states in the Northeast (New Hampshire and Massachusetts 
are tied for least religious). Moreover, religious affiliations in 
the state are comparable with those in the rest of the nation. 
Seventy-five percent of Nebraska residents identify as 
Christian, compared with 71 percent of Americans overall. 
White evangelical Protestants, who often lead efforts to pass 
religious liberty legislation and who are more likely to sup-
port it than other religious groups, make up about 25 percent 
of the population in Nebraska and the country.
Finally, Nebraska lawmakers have not introduced reli-
gious freedom legislation. This means that survey respon-
dents answered questions about a hypothetical scenario or 
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one they may have observed on the news from other states 
rather than events affecting their neighbors or fellow citi-
zens. This allows us to understand how narratives about reli-
gious freedom that draw from ideas about freedom and 
democracy operate ideologically (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 
2016; Thomas and Whitehead 2015). As Laurel Westbrook 
and Kristen Schilt (2014) argued, especially when it comes 
to cotemporary debates over LGBTQ rights, definitions of 
sex, gender, and sexuality operate at an imaginary level, 
whereby individuals draw from suppositional ideas and 
hypothetical scenes, rather than specific evidence or experi-
ence. The data we analyze include open-ended survey data, 
which allow us to examine the underlying logic people have 
regarding their views on religious freedom laws.
Methods
Data
Our data come from the 2015 Nebraska Annual Social 
Indicators Survey (NASIS). NASIS is an annual, cross-sec-
tional, omnibus survey of Nebraska adults ages 19 and older, 
which is conducted by the Bureau of Sociological Research 
at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. The 2015 NASIS 
was a mail survey sent to randomly selected address-based 
sample of 3,500 Nebraska households that was provided by 
Survey Sampling International. Respondents were selected 
within sampled households using the next-birthday tech-
nique. Data collection consisted of three mailings (initial sur-
vey packet with a $1 cash incentive, postcard reminder, and 
a replacement survey packet) sent between August 12, 2015, 
and October 20, 2015 (NASIS 2014–2015 Methodology 
Report). A total of 1,143 respondents completed NASIS 
2015, for a response rate of 32.7 percent (American 
Association for Public Opinion Research Response Rate 1; 
American Association for Public Opinion Research 2009).
NASIS data have the advantage of not only quantitatively 
measuring people’s views on religious freedom laws but also 
including data on how people justify their views. Because 
our aim is to examine how people justify their view through 
open-ended responses, we do not weight the NASIS data to 
generalize to Nebraska’s adult population. Rather, we gener-
alize findings to the sample of NASIS respondents. Table 1 
displays the demographic, political, and religious makeup of 
the completed NASIS 2015 sample and displays the 
unweighted respondent characteristics from Pew’s national 
sample, which we use as a national comparison (Pew 
Research Center 2016d). The distributions show that NASIS 
respondents were more likely to be female, religious, and 
Republican but also less racially and ethnically diverse.
Measures
We focus our analyses on the NASIS 2015 questions asking 
about respondents’ views of religious freedom laws (see 
Table 1. NASIS and Pew Research Center Respondent 





 Male 40.22 52.35
 Female 59.78 47.65
Sexual orientation  
 Heterosexual/straight 97.25 —
 Gay or lesbian 1.01 —
 Bisexual 0.92 —
 Something else 0.18 —
 Unsure 0.64 —
Know LGB person  
 Yes 49.32 —
 No 50.68 —
Race  
 White 86.26 77.04
 Nonwhite/multirace 13.74 22.96
Hispanic  
 Yes 2.94 10.86
 No 97.06 89.14
Age (mean) 60 53
Education  
 Less than high school 2.43 6.98
 High school 17.27 25.25
 Some college 22.5 26
 BA or higher 57.8 41.77
Political party  
 Democratic 28.52 32.34
 Republican 43.88 27.41
 Independent 24.01 37.21
 Other 3.59 3.05
Political ideology  
 Very liberal 3.67 7.3
 Liberal 15.5 15.89
 Middle of the road 39.27 35.89
 Conservative 29.82 32.13
 Very conservative 9.08 9.2
 Other 2.66 —
Religion  
 Protestant 55.65 52.59
 Catholic 28.7 20.3
 Jewish 0.37 1.68
 Muslim 0.19 0.96
 None 13.24 6.9
 Other 1.85 17.56
Born-again Christian  
 Yes 28.48 43.54
 No 71.52 56.46
Religious attendance  
 Several times a week 6.25 14.96
 Once a week 27.41 24.69
 Nearly every week 11.52 13
 About once a month 8.84  
 (continued)
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and discussed common themes. These provisional codes 
became the basis for axial coding, which tested the relation-
ships among emerging categories and confirmed whether 
these themes continued to emerge from the data (Corbin and 
Strauss 1990). Initially, using the coding structure, two 
research assistants coded an initial set of 50 responses. The 
authors and research assistants then met to resolve all incon-
sistent codes between the two coders. The research assistants 
coded the remaining qualitative responses, while meeting with 
the first author to discuss coding decisions and maintain 
consistency.
The coding structure was an iterative hierarchy of themes 
(Figure 1), with parent, child, and grandchild codes. The par-
ent codes included: “rights” (references to a person’s or 
group’s “right,” either explicitly or implicitly), universal truth 
(declarations that draw from broad ideas about the nature of 
the world or humankind), “free market” (references to capi-
talism or the economic system), and sexuality irrelevant 
(claims that sexuality or sexual orientation does not or should 
not matter in business contexts). The parent codes represented 
higher level ideas respondents drew on in contextualizing 
their views of religious freedom laws. The child codes further 
characterize the ideas within each parent code. The child and 
grandchild codes offer more nuance in how respondents used 
the logic (i.e., parent code) in their responses. For instance, 
for the “rights” parent code, the child codes identify whether 
the respondent used the logic of “rights” related to business 
owners or customers. We then noted whether the respondents 
who used business owner’s rights focused their responses 
specifically on a business owner’s religious beliefs or rights 
nonspecific to religion. Similarly, we noted whether respon-
dents who used customer’s rights made explicit reference to 
gay or lesbian persons or to customers generally.
In the following section, we first report the frequency of 
each parent code in the data.4 “Quantitizing” the qualitative 
Table 2. Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey Question 
Wording.
Question Response Option
Do you favor or oppose laws that allow 
business owners to deny services 
to gay men or lesbians based on the 
owner’s religious beliefs?
Favor, oppose
Why do you favor or oppose laws 
that allow business owners to deny 
services to gay men or lesbians based 





 Several time a year 16.16 17.83
 About once a year 8.3 16.73
 Less than once a year 8.93  
 Never 12.59 12.8
Religious influence  
 Very much 33.81 —
 Quite a bit 29.89 —
 Some 18.51 —
 A little 8.19 —
 None 4.98 —
 Not religious 4.63 —
Note: NASIS = Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey.
Table 1. (continued)
Table 2). The first question asked respondents whether they 
favor or oppose laws that allow business owners to deny ser-
vices to gay men or lesbians on the basis of the owners’ reli-
gious beliefs. The second is an open-ended question, which 
immediately followed the first question, asking respondents 
why they favored or opposed such laws. A total of 1,117 
respondents (97.73 percent) answered the closed-ended, 
favor/oppose question, and 838 respondents (73.32 percent 
of all respondents and 75.02 percent of those who answered 
the closed-ended question) elaborated on their opinion by 
writing responses to the open-ended question. Responses 
were typically brief (one to two sentences) but capture the 
shared frameworks or cultural schemas that are available to 
people as they make sense of religious freedom debates 
(Blair-Loy 2001).
Analysis
We used an explanatory mixed-methods approach (Creswell 
and Plano Clark 2011) to examine and explore respondents’ 
views of religious freedom laws. First, we analyzed the per-
centages of NASIS respondents who favored and opposed 
religious freedom laws. Using χ2 tests, we examined how 
NASIS respondents’ views differ by demographic, political, 
and religious characteristics, and we compared these find-
ings with how opinion of religious freedom laws varies by 
these characteristics among national data from the Pew 
Research Center (2014).
Our next set of analyses centered on the qualitative data. 
Qualitative analysis allows us to move beyond the quantitative 
outcomes of “favor versus oppose” to hear from respondents 
about how they contextualize their views on a complex issue 
implicated by religious freedom laws. Qualitative coding of 
the open-ended responses was iterative. First, all three authors 
read the open-ended responses, and each author generated an 
initial list of codes that emerged from the data (Crabtree and 
Miller 1992). Second, we cross-checked provisional codes 
4Some quotations did not fit into the coding scheme reported in this 
article. The themes in these quotations either occurred at such low 
frequencies that they did not warrant their own codes or showed 
that the respondents did not understand the topic of the question. 
For example, some respondents appeared to interpret the question 
as asking about the ability to hire or fire an employee on the basis 
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data shows how often each code appeared in the data 
(Driscoll et al. 2007; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). We used 
χ2 tests to examine which types of respondents (demographic, 
political, and religious characteristics) used which logic to 
contextualize their views on religious freedom laws. Finally, 
we explored how respondents used logics to justify both 
favoring and opposing religious freedom laws. Because we 
are most interested in how the same cultural schemas can be 
used to reach different conclusion, in this analysis we focus 
on the only two parent codes that were used nearly evenly by 
respondents on both sides of the issue: rights and free mar-
ket. We used direct quotes from respondents to illustrate how 
respondents articulated their views.
Limitations
NASIS data are not generalizable to the U.S. population; we 
cannot assume that our data resemble national opinion, 
though some evidence suggests that our results may be com-
parable. For example, 32 percent of respondents in a 2017 
PRRI national survey reported that “small businesses should 
be able to refuse to provide services to gay and lesbian people 
on religious grounds,” compared with 36 percent of NASIS 
respondents, and 56 percent of white evangelicals held this 
view in the PRRI survey compared with 52 percent of white 
evangelical NASIS respondents (Cox and Jones 2017).5 
Another limitation of our data is that the survey asks only a 
single question related to religious freedom legislation. There 
are additional topics legislated in religious freedom bills that 
our data do not address, including transgender people using 
public restrooms, employers being required to provide birth 
control, same-sex couples accessing fertility treatments, or 
religious leaders being required to recognize same-sex mar-
riage (all topics legislated in religious freedom bills). Given 
that bills proposed in states do not share common language, it 
is difficult for a single survey to capture public opinion on the 
issue of “religious freedom” as a whole. Yet because religious 
freedom legislation has implications beyond wedding-related 
services, surveys should attempt to capture the public’s opin-
ion on a range of issues. In a related vein, our survey was 
conducted very shortly after the Obergefell v. Hodges deci-
sion. Future work should track whether the public’s attitudes 
change as more legislation is introduced or passed and as 
more cases are publicized.
Findings
Views on Religious Freedom Laws
Among the NASIS respondents, 36.31 percent favored 
religious freedom laws, and 63.69 percent opposed them.6 
Figure 1. Coding structure for open-ended responses.
of sexual orientation. Other respondents wrote explanations of their 
views on same-sex marriage. We excluded these exceptions from 
the analyses.
5Question wording from the PRRI survey was the most comparable 
with our survey, but a data embargo until 2018 prohibits us from 
running analyses to draw further comparisons with our data. For 
this reason, we use national data from the Pew Research Center 
(2016d) for comparisons.
6Our initial results indicated that 35.35 percent favored religious 
freedom laws and that 64.55 percent opposed religious freedom 
laws. Coding the open-ended responses, however, revealed 18 
respondents who we believe mismarked their responses to the 
closed-ended item (e.g., respondents marking that they oppose reli-
gious freedom laws but writing that they support laws that allow 
business owners to deny services to gay men and lesbians). Thus, 
we created a measure that corrected these inconsistent responses. 
Because there was a less than 1 percentage point difference between 
the original and corrected measure, we use the corrected measure 
for the remaining analyses. The distributions were also similar 
to weighted analyses, which showed 63.67 percent opposing and 
36.33 percent favoring religious freedom laws among the original 
variable and 62.97 percent opposing and 37.03 percent favoring 
religious freedom laws among the corrected variable.
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In comparison, national data from the Pew Research Center 
(2016d) show that 52.32 percent of the Pew survey respon-
dents think that businesses providing wedding-related ser-
vices, such as catering or flowers, should be allowed to refuse 
services to same-sex couples, whereas 47.68 percent reported 
that businesses should be required to provide wedding-related 
services. Similarly, analyses from a national experimental 
survey reveal that 53 percent of Americans believe that a pho-
tographer should be able to refuse services to a same-sex 
couple (Powell et al. 2017). We anticipated that results from 
surveys that asked specifically about “wedding-related ser-
vices” would be more closely divided than NASIS data 
because those questions emphasizes the contested topic of 
marriage. The NASIS data show that when asking about busi-
nesses generally, the result is fewer people favoring religious 
freedom laws (see also Cox and Jones 2017).
Chi-square analyses, nonetheless, show similar signifi-
cant differences in views of religious freedom laws by demo-
graphic, political, and religious characteristics for both 
NASIS and Pew data (Table 3). Both data sets show signifi-
cant differences in views of religious freedom laws by gen-
der, political party, political ideology, religious affiliation, 
born-again Christian identity, and religious attendance. 
These characteristics are all associated with views of reli-
gious freedom laws in similar ways as other LGB policies 
(Brumbaugh et al. 2008; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; 
Lewis 2011; Lewis and Gossett 2008; Olson et al. 2006; 
Pearl and Galupo 2007; Rowatt et al. 2009; Sherkat et al. 
2010; Swank et al. 2013; Whitehead 2010; Woodford et al. 
2012). For example, 46.35 percent men favor religious free-
dom laws compared with 29.76 percent of women in NASIS, 
χ2(1) = 30.9474, p < .001), and 57.04 percent of men and 
47.26 percent of women favor religious freedom laws in the 
Pew data, χ2(1) = 17.9394, p < .001). Furthermore, Democrats, 
liberals, and nonreligious respondents are more likely to 
oppose religious freedom laws. Interestingly, unlike in anal-
yses of views of other LGB issues, such as same-sex mar-
riage, views of religious freedom laws did not significantly 
differ by respondent education level in the NASIS data, χ2(5) 
= 4.2979, p = .507, or Pew data, χ2(7) = 7.0072, p = .428.
In addition, NASIS included respondent characteristics 
not measured in the Pew survey, including respondent sex-
ual orientation and whether the respondent knows an LGB 
person. Unsurprisingly, LGB respondents almost unani-
mously opposed religious freedom laws, χ2(4) = 13.5394, p 
= .009, and respondents who know an LGB person were 
significantly more likely to oppose religious freedom laws 
than those who do not know an LGB person, χ2(1) = 
21.2502, p < .001).
Logics Used for Views
Table 4 displays the frequency and percentage that each 
qualitative code characterized the logic used in responses to 
the question asking respondents why they hold their views 
on religious freedom laws and the breakdown in support for 
religious freedom laws by each type of logic. (See Figure 1 
for an illustration of the full coding hierarchy.) Note that the 
codes are not mutually exclusive; some responses were char-
acterized by more than one type of logic, such as making 
both a rights and a sexuality-irrelevant argument. A little 
over half of responses (59 percent) included a rights-based 
argument, with the next most frequent logic used being uni-
versal truth, at 26 percent of the responses. Free market and 
sexuality irrelevant responses were the least frequent, at 9 
percent and 11 percent, respectively.
As seen in Table 4, support for religious freedom laws 
was highest among respondents who used “free market” 
logic in their responses, with 57 percent of those respondents 
favoring the laws. This is followed closely by the “rights” 
logic code, with 54 percent of those respondents favoring the 
laws. Support for religious freedom laws was lowest among 
those respondents using “sexuality irrelevant” logic (7 per-
cent) and for those using “universal truth” logic (16 percent). 
Below we present qualitative analysis on the “free market” 
and “rights” codes because these were the logics shared by 
respondents with opposing views.
As reported in Table 5, χ2 analyses showed few consis-
tent demographic, political, and religious trends in what 
types of respondents used the various logics. The respon-
dents who justified their views on religious freedom laws 
by drawing on rights-based logic were more likely to know 
an LGB person, have higher education levels, and more 
likely to identify as a Republican and as politically conser-
vative. Whether the response drew on rights logic versus 
another type of logic did not significantly differ by other 
respondent demographic and religious characteristics. The 
only demographic characteristic that significantly differed 
for the free market code was that the respondents employ-
ing that logic were significantly more likely to report know-
ing an LGB person.
Different Sides, Same Logic: Rights and the Free 
Market
Both sides rely on two logics that are foundational to the 
American experience: the protection of rights and the capi-
talist economy. People who favor the rights of business 
owners to deny services to gay men and lesbians relied 
almost exclusively on these two logics. Although responses 
from those who oppose the rights of business owners to 
deny services to gay men and lesbians were more varied, 
these responses also relied heavily on “rights” and the “free 
market” to justify their position. That both sides used the 
cultural schemas of rights and free market, but reached dif-
ferent conclusions, points to disagreements not over the 
value of freedom or equality per se but rather over the ques-
tions of whose rights are most worthy of protection and 
whose freedom is potentially jeopardized in the current 
moment.
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Table 3. Views of Religious Freedom Laws by Respondent Characteristics, NASIS and Pew.
NASIS Pew Research Center
 χ2 χ2
 Favor (%) Oppose (%) (p Value) Favor (%) Oppose (%) (p Value)
Gender  
 Male 46.35 53.65 30.95 56.94 43.06 17.94
 Female 29.77 70.23 (<.001) 47.26 52.74 (<.001)
Sexual orientation  
 Heterosexual/straight 37.48 62.52 13.54 — — —
 Gay or lesbian 0 100 (.009) — —  
 Bisexual 0 100 — —  
 Something else 50 50 — —  
 Unsure 14.29 85.71 — —  
Know LGB person  
 Yes 29.72 70.28 21.25 — — —
 No 43.22 56.78 (<.001) — —  
Race  
 White 37.37 62.63 4.84 55.84 44.16 40.42
 Nonwhite/multirace 29.17 70.83 (.304) 40.42 59.58 (<.001)
Hispanic  
 Yes 22.58 77.42 2.75 40.2 59.8 13.12
 No 37.14 62.86 (.097) 53.76 46.24 (<.001)
Age (mean)  
Education  
 Less than high school 28 72 4.3 46.09 53.91 7.07
 High school 35.91 64.09 (.507) 51.58 48.42 –0.428
 Some college 39.74 60.26 51.1 48.9  
 BA or higher 34.2 65.8 54.31 45.69  
Political party  
 Democratic 15.36 84.64 125.83 34.53 65.47 174.03
 Republican 53.93 46.07 (<.001) 73.75 26.25 (<.001)
 Independent 31.52 68.48 51.29 48.71  
 Other 24.32 75.68 57.41 42.59  
Political ideology  
 Very liberal 7.5 92.5 201.15 28.26 71.74 197.6
 Liberal 13.1 86.9 (<.001) 31.88 68.12 (<.001)
 Middle of the road 24.94 75.06 45.86 54.14  
 Conservative 55.94 44.06 68.48 31.52  
 Very conservative 77.32 22.68 76.57 23.43  
 Other 28.57 71.43 — —  
Religion  
 Protestant 44.07 55.93 51.19 61.65 38.35 81.21
 Catholic 35.29 64.71 (<.001) 44.68 55.32 (<.001)
 Jewish 0 100 31.25 68.75  
 Muslim 0 100 27.78 72.22  
 None 13.99 86.01 35.88 64.12  
 Other 21.05 78.95 42.25 57.75  
Born-again Christian  
 Yes 52.53 47.47 43.46 65.28 34.72 26.79
 No 30.7 69.3 (<.001) 51.41 48.59 (<.001)
Religious attendance  
 Several times a week 66.18 33.82 81.39 71.89 28.11 99.96
 Once a week 45.67 54.33 (<.001) 60.93 39.07 (<.001)
 (continued)
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Rights. Respondents who used a “rights” logic shared the 
idea that Americans have a fundamental right to live their 
lives freely. For those who opposed religious freedom laws, 
this meant a focus on an individual’s right to be free from 
discrimination. For those who support religious freedom 
laws, this meant a focus on an individual’s right to be free 
from government control and freedom to act in ways that 
uphold their religious convictions.
Some respondents who used a “rights” logic interpreted a 
law that would allow a business owner to deny services to 
gay men or lesbians on the basis of their religious belief to be 
codifying discrimination against people on the basis of sex-
ual orientation. Their responses foregrounded issues of fair-
ness and equality. As one person commented, “It is a civil 
right for all Americans to be treated fairly.” Another noted, 
“Government supported discrimination on any basis is 
wrong.” This sentiment echoed what others said, including: 
“I am against all forms of discrimination”; “Business owners 
cannot refuse service to a specific group”; “I oppose laws 
because it can be used as an excuse to discriminate”; and 
“Everyone should have same access to services despite the 
service provider’s personal beliefs. Otherwise, it would be 
blatant discrimination.” Religious freedom bills are discrimi-
natory against gay men and lesbians, according to these 
respondents, and antithetical to their belief that gays and les-
bians have the right to be treated equally and to not face 
discrimination.
Many people drew a parallel to discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation with forms of discrimination that 
Americans widely oppose (Pew Research Center 2016b). 
The following comment is exemplary of respondents who 
made reference to racial discrimination: “It is discrimina-
tory! We may as well allow people to refuse service to people 
of other races.” Similarly, another person explained that they 
opposed laws that would allow business owners to deny ser-
vices “because businesses discriminating against LGBT peo-
ple is no different than half a century ago when businesses 
discriminated against blacks. Supporting civil rights means 
everyone gets to sit at the lunch counter.” Some also made 
the comparison with discrimination on the basis of religion. 
Table 4. Logic Used in Response to Open-ended Question and Views of Religious Freedom Laws by Logic.
Code Frequency Percentage
Religious Freedom Laws (%)
Favor Oppose
Rights 491 59 54 46
Universal truth 217 26 16 84
Free market 75 9 57 43
Sexuality irrelevant 95 11  7 93
Note: N = 1,143 total respondents and n = 838 respondents who answered the open-ended question. We coded 58 responses that drew on other 
themes, but at low frequencies, as “other.”
NASIS Pew Research Center
 χ2 χ2
 Favor (%) Oppose (%) (p Value) Favor (%) Oppose (%) (p Value)
 Nearly every week 48.8 51.2 48.22 51.78  
 About once a month 32.65 67.35  
 Several time a year 30.39 69.61 40.3 59.7  
 About once a year 20.88 79.12 48.6 51.4  
 Less than once a year 26.8 73.2  
 Never 18.57 81.43 37.92 62.08  
Religious influence  
 Very much 48.65 51.35 72.75 — — —
 Quite a bit 41.52 58.48 (<.001) — —  
 Some 24.76 75.24 — —  
 A little 24.18 75.82 — —  
 None 12.73 87.27 — —  
 Not religious 11.54 88.46 — —  
Note: NASIS = Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey.
Table 3. (continued)
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Table 5. Percentage of Respondents Using Rights Logic to Explain Their Views of Religious Freedom Laws by Respondent 
Characteristics.
Rights Logic Free Market
 χ2 χ2
 Yes (%) No (%) (p Value) Yes (%) No (%) (p Value)
Gender  
 Male 43.44 56.56 0.0323 7.01 92.99 0.0924
 Female 43.99 56.01 (.857) 6.54 93.46 (.761)
Know LGB person  
 Yes 47.13 52.87 4.9528 9.06 90.94 9.9209
 No 40.47 59.53 (.026) 4.32 95.68 (.002)
Education  
 High school or less 27.96 72.04 44.2334 3.79 96.21 3.9716
 Some college 39.39 60.61 <.001 7.67 92.33 .137
 BA or higher 53.94 46.06 7.68 92.32  
Political party  
 Democratic 40.97 59.03 4.3667 5.16 94.84 3.8507
 Republican 47.17 52.83 (.224) 6.71 93.29 (.278)
 Independent 42.53 57.47 9.20 90.80  
 Other 35.90 64.10 5.13 94.87  
Political ideology  
 Very liberal 37.50 62.50 22.0622 7.5 92.5 8.2824
 Liberal 44.38 55.62 (<.001) 4.73 95.27 (.141)
 Middle of the road 36.45 63.55 4.91 95.09  
 Conservative 51.69 48.31 8.62 91.38  
 Very conservative 53.54 46.46 11.11 88.89  
 Other 44.83 55.17 6.9 93.1  
Religion  
 Protestant 48.09 51.91 10.0652 6.82 93.18 0.5789
 Catholic 39.03 60.97 (.073) 6.77 93.23 (.989)
 Jewish 25.00 75.00 0 100  
 Muslim 50.00 50.00 0 100  
 None 40.56 59.44 6.29 93.71  
 Other 30.00 70.00 5.00 95.00  
Born-again Christian  
 Yes 42.86 57.14 0.2994 7.31 92.69 0.1061
 No 44.71 55.29 (.584) 6.75 93.25 (.745)
Religious attendance  
 Several times a week 54.29 45.71 11.1354 7.14 92.86 4.4086
 Once a week 40.07 59.93 (.133) 6.19 93.81 (.732)
 Nearly every week 51.16 48.84 6.2 93.8  
 About once a month 40.40 59.60 3.03 96.97  
 Several time a year 40.33 59.67 8.29 91.71  
 About once a year 40.86 59.14 7.53 92.47  
 Less than once a year 50.00 50.00 5.00 95.00  
 Never 41.84 58.16 8.51 91.49  
Religious influence  
 Very much 46.58 53.42 4.3497 5.26 94.74 7.7659
 Quite a bit 39.58 60.42 (.500) 6.55 93.45 (.170)
 Some 41.83 58.17 7.21 92.79  
 A little 46.74 53.26 9.78 90.22  
 None 42.86 57.14 12.5 87.5  
 Not religious 46.15 53.85 1.92 98.08  
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For instance, people made comments such as “I don’t believe 
services should be denied based on sexual preference or reli-
gious beliefs.” Another comment underscores the logic that a 
diverse America necessitates the need to protect individual 
freedom: “every one has the right to any service gay, straight, 
jewish [sic], yellow, green.” According to this logic, 
Americans should expect to be free from discrimination: 
sexual orientation, like race, religion, or other aspects of 
individual identity, should not be grounds to treat people 
unequally.
On the other side, supporters of religious freedom laws 
focused on the rights of business owners to be free to make 
their own decisions on whom to serve. Here respondents 
emphasized a general freedom belonging to business owners 
(as opposed to a specific right belonging to business owners 
as we outline below). This freedom to make decisions about 
whom to serve was not necessarily tied to the business own-
er’s religious beliefs, but connected to the general rights of 
owning and operating a business. According to one com-
ment: “Whether you agree or disagree with a business own-
er’s policies, if they own it, they can do what they want. 
Doesn’t mean its right/wrong.” Another respondent 
responded more aggressively: “I’m tired of this being shoved 
down our throat. A business should have the right to serve or 
not [serve] anyone they want to.” Several respondents refer-
enced a sign common to storefronts, “No shoes, no shirt- no 
service!” One respondent added, “Business owners have 
been doing this for years.” As these comments illustrate, 
people using this logic interpreted the potential for business 
owners to refuse service to a gay or lesbian person as an 
extension of other forms of decisions that business owners 
could make in terms of providing service, such as denying 
service to someone not wearing a shirt or shoes. Respondents 
privileged business owners’ ability to make decisions inde-
pendent from what they viewed as governmental interfer-
ence; as one person remarked, “I think government should 
stay out of it.” This logic was akin to the discrimination jus-
tification outlined earlier in that it was a blanket sort of logic: 
people should be free from all forms of discrimination in the 
same way that business owners should be free from regula-
tion of any kind.
Many respondents emphasized not only that business 
owners should have the right to refuse service for any reason 
but also specifically that business owners should have the 
right to make decisions that support their religious beliefs. 
Here respondents emphasized the First Amendment and the 
protection of religious freedom for all Americans. Some 
illustrative comments include “1st Amendment of US 
Constitution: Right to free exercise of religion (not just 
thought)” and “protection of the First Amendment” and 
“Owners should not be forced to go against their religious 
beliefs that should be guaranteed under the Constitution.” As 
these quotations illustrate, some respondents characterized 
religious freedom laws as necessary reiterations of the exist-
ing constitutional right of business owners. For instance, one 
respondent commented, “the constitution states that we, as 
US citizens have freedom of religion. If we must provide 
services to gays or face legal penalties, this is denying us the 
freedom to practice our faith.” According to respondents 
such as this one, religious freedom laws are necessary in the 
wake of marriage equality and expanding LGBT rights 
because some business owners have religious objections to 
homosexuality and same-sex marriage.
Other respondents did not invoke the Constitution or First 
Amendment explicitly but nonetheless pointed to business 
owners’ right to practice their religious beliefs. For instance, 
respondents wrote comments such as “no private business 
owner should be compelled to do things against their religion”; 
“Because of the persons [sic] religious beliefs should take prec-
edent [sic]”; “As a business owner you should not have to do 
something against your religious beliefs!!!”; “I believe this 
country was founded because our fore fathers believed in the 
right to practice our religion without persecution by the govern-
ment”; and “owner of business should be able to conduct busi-
ness in accordance with his religious convictions—to be true to 
himself. He owns the business!” These comments further 
underscore that support of religious freedom laws centers on 
their belief that without such laws, business owners’ rights to 
practice their religion are infringed upon.
Both sides create parallels between social identity catego-
ries (e.g., being gay and being black, being Christian and 
being gay) to justify their positions on the basis of the over-
arching theme of individual freedom. As one respondent who 
opposes religious freedom laws wrote, “I oppose because I 
don’t want someone’s religious beliefs to determine how I or 
my family live our lives. Why are their beliefs more impor-
tant than mine?” This statement is remarkably similar to one 
written by a respondent who supports religious freedom laws: 
“No one (either side) should be forced to do something they 
don’t believe in, that makes them very uncomfortable.” This 
call to the rights of “either side” emphasizes the shared cul-
tural schema among those with different perspectives on reli-
gious freedom laws. Despite using similar schema, 
respondents nonetheless reach different conclusions about 
these laws, an implication that we return to in the discussion.
The Free Market. Our data find a “free market” logic to be 
less common than the “rights” logic to support or oppose 
religious freedom laws. For those who use a “free market” 
logic, 56 percent favored a business owner’s right to refuse 
service to gay men and lesbians (see Table 4). A significant 
portion of “free market” responses, however, used this logic 
to oppose religious freedom laws. The “free market” code 
captures any reference to the capitalist economy, particularly 
the motivation and risk of generating profit that accompanies 
running a business. For those who support religious freedom 
laws, this generally meant respondents who justified their 
position by arguing that gay and lesbian customers in the free 
market economy can choose an alternative business if one 
business owner refuses to serve them. For those who oppose 
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religious freedom laws using this logic, they emphasized that 
business owners should not let morals or values get in the 
way of the primary purpose of business: generating a profit.
Respondents who favored religious freedom laws using a 
“free market” logic painted a picture of an economy full of 
choices for customers. Their responses suggested that there 
are many businesses willing to serve gay men and lesbians 
and that gay men and lesbians should frequent those busi-
nesses. One illustrative example comes from a respondent 
who writes, “the issue is not denial of service, it is exercise 
of conscience. The ‘services’ are readily available else-
where.” This respondent makes explicit what was implicit in 
most other responses using a similar logic: that the abun-
dance of American businesses means that gay men and lesbi-
ans are not harmed if they are not able to receive services 
from one or a few that refuse to serve them. As other 
responses indicate, “They [gay men and lesbians] have 
plenty of other option[s]”; “There are plenty of gay-friendly 
businesses”; and “Business owners should be able to run 
their businesses as they want and not be controlled by the 
government. If gays don’t like it they can buy their things 
other place[s].” Sentiments like these are somewhat surpris-
ing coming from our sample, as Nebraska has a significant 
rural population where choice in businesses tends to be lim-
ited. Yet these responses mirror a neoliberal logic, imagining 
the economy as diverse, vast, and accessible to all Americans 
(Amable 2011). In tandem with a “rights” logic supporting 
business owners who deny services to gay men and lesbians, 
respondents using a “free market” logic implied that reli-
gious freedom laws do not actually harm gay men and lesbi-
ans. Instead, the “harm” at stake in religious freedom debates 
is over the protection of religious people who operate their 
businesses in a free market.
Respondents who oppose religious freedom laws using a 
“free market” logic suggest that the American economy is, 
by its nature, objective and nondiscriminatory, and to get in 
the way of this “free market” process (understood here as not 
doing business with gay men and lesbians) is to get in the 
way of capitalist American values. One respondent calls it a 
“bad business decision” for a business owner to refuse ser-
vice and potential profit from certain “law abiding citizens” 
and goes on to state, “I think the government should stay out 
of it. It’s called natural consequences.” Although many 
respondents emphasized negative outcomes for actual busi-
nesses (as we describe below), other comments focused 
more broadly on the ideology of the free market. These 
respondents wrote comments such as “Commerce is a privi-
lege to serve the public. All the public” and “there should be 
a distinct separation between religion and commerce. If there 
is demand, it would kill a capitalist society.” For respondents 
who oppose religious freedom laws, the “free market” under-
scores the democracy and equality that is foundational to 
America, including its economy.
Many respondents using this logic emphasized that cus-
tomer identity is less important than the money they spend 
and that business owners should be concerned only with the 
latter. As one respondent put it, “money all spends the same.” 
Other comments echo this belief that business owners should 
not refuse service of to anyone: “the idea of business is to 
make money. To refuse a money making transaction is stu-
pid” and “as a business owner, you don’t turn away busi-
ness.” Some respondents pointed to the negative 
consequences of withholding services to a certain popula-
tion, like one respondent who believed it would have a nega-
tive effect on the businesses themselves: “I think those biz 
[businesses] owner’s will fail with that way of thinking and 
doing biz [business].” Responses like these combined a logic 
of “rights” (freedom from discrimination) and the “free mar-
ket” to oppose the protection of business owners who choose 
to refuse services to gay men and lesbians.
In sum, the logic of “free market” was used by both 
respondents who supported and opposed religious freedom 
law. However, their comments underscore diverging view-
points with regard to whose actions and decisions within the 
capitalist economy are salient. For respondents who favor the 
laws, the focus is on the decision of gay and lesbian custom-
ers (i.e., they can go elsewhere). In contrast, those who oppose 
the laws focus on the decision of the business owner (i.e., they 
are making a bad business decision). What these positions 
have in common, though, is a clear product of neoliberal ide-
ology: that social conflicts and divisions can (and should) be 
adjudicated by the free market. On both sides of the debate, 
this logic uses the guise of economic forces to obscure other 
solutions to persistent inequalities (Duggan 2004).
Discussion and Conclusion
Religious freedom laws may be the current “battleground” 
over LGBTQ rights, and some argue that their passage in 25 
states (as of June 2017) represents a backlash to increased 
acceptance of LGBTQ people (Corvino et al. 2017). Yet our 
findings suggest that the introduction and passage of these 
laws may not reflect broad support. Using Nebraska as a case 
study, we find that a clear majority (64 percent) opposes laws 
that allow business owners to deny services to gay men or 
lesbians on the basis of the owners’ religious beliefs. The fact 
that support for religious freedom laws is at only 36 percent 
in Nebraska is particularly interesting given that Nebraska is 
seen as a red state, and more of its citizens identify as 
Republicans compared to national averages (Saad 2013). 
Despite its leaning more conservative in terms of political 
ideology, Nebraska is comparable with the national average 
in terms of both public opinion on LGBTQ rights and religi-
osity (Pew Research Center 2014; Stange and Kazyak 2016). 
Thus, treating Nebraskans’ public opinion as a case study is 
instructive in terms of public opinion about religious free-
dom laws.
Our work highlights the overlap in the logics used and the 
saliency of the cultural schemas of rights, discrimination, 
freedom, and capitalism as people make sense of religious 
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freedom laws that directly reference sexual minorities. 
Despite using similar frameworks of rights, respondents who 
used this language reached very different conclusions about 
whose rights (and which rights) should be protected and who 
faces potential harm. Specifically, respondents who oppose 
religious freedom laws view gay men and lesbians as a group 
facing potential mistreatment and therefore as a group in 
need of protection. According to their logic, gay and lesbian 
individuals are like other marginalized groups, including 
African Americans, whose civil rights either have been or 
have the potential to be infringed upon because of social 
prejudices. Respondents view religious freedom legislation 
as threatening the freedom of gay men and lesbians to fully 
participate in public life. In contrast, people who favor reli-
gious freedom laws view business owners as potentially 
harmed if they are unable to exercise their religion in making 
business decisions. These respondents view the right to prac-
tice one’s religion as paramount and, for conservative 
Christians, under threat in light of the advancement of 
LGBTQ rights, particularly same-sex marriage. Thus, they 
see religious freedom bills as necessary to protect the rights 
of Christian business owners.
When both sides rely on American values related to free-
dom while describing different groups whose rights or inter-
ests are in jeopardy, it may appear as if the two opposing 
sides share equal footing within American life and law. This 
is bolstered by cultural schemas emphasizing equality and 
the belief that no one should be discriminated against, in 
addition to the impersonal and objective capitalist free mar-
ket. Such schemas, however, obscure historic and persistent 
inequalities across groups (Brown 2006). Specifically, gays 
and lesbians have faced obstacles to being fully visible and 
accepted within American society in ways that Christians 
have not (Canady 2009; Parker and Barreto 2013). Gays and 
lesbians, as well as non-Christians, face discrimination that 
does not affect their heterosexual or Christian counterparts 
(Mishel 2016; Schilt 2008). Researchers examining employ-
ment discrimination on religious grounds, for example, find 
that Muslims, pagans, and atheists are more likely to face 
discrimination compared with other religious groups and 
nonreligious people (Wallace, Wright, and Hyde 2014; 
Wright et al. 2013). Additionally, federal and state laws pro-
tect people from discrimination on the basis of religion in all 
50 states, and in contrast, there is no federal protection for 
people on the basis of sexual orientation, and only 20 states 
offer such protection (Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission 2018). Taken together these pieces of evidence 
illustrate the ways in which religion and sexuality are key 
boundary makers (Burke 2016; Edgell et al. 2016; Edgell 
and Tranby 2010; Emerson, Smith, and Sikkink 1999).
Nonetheless, some evangelical Christians perceive them-
selves to be under threat in the current moment. According to 
data from the Pew Research Center (2016c), 41 percent of this 
group reported that it is difficult to be an evangelical Christian 
in America. Likewise, a majority of white evangelicals (61 
percent) believe that religious liberty is threatened in America 
(Cox and Jones 2012). Thus, the emphasis on rights and equal-
ity may be an intentional strategy of conservative religious 
activists to emphasize perceived oppression and persecution 
of the conservative Christians within America in an era of 
increasing visibility and acceptance of LGBTQ people. 
Whereas these activists had once used the framework of “spe-
cial rights” to protest advancement of LGBTQ rights (i.e., that 
gays and lesbians were a minority group advocating for rights 
that went above and beyond what the rest of Americans had), 
it may be that the new conceptualization of Christians as a 
religious group under threat will hold more sway with some 
Americans.
Interestingly, respondents on both sides of this debate 
who use a “free market” logic to justify their position focus 
on the opposite group from their counterparts exclusively 
using a “rights” logic. For proponents of religious freedom 
laws, a free market rationale emphasizes that gay men and 
lesbians are not harmed as a result of religious freedom bills. 
According to them, even though gay men and lesbians may 
encounter a business owner who will not serve them, gays 
and lesbians are not harmed because the free market provides 
ample business options for them to pursue. Yet on the other 
side, respondents draw on understandings about capitalism 
to posit that business owners would be harmed by religious 
freedom bills because denying service to a group of potential 
customers would in fact be detrimental to business profits 
and contrary to the philosophy of the free market.
Furthermore, that both those who support and oppose reli-
gious freedom legislation draw on the cultural schema of 
“free market” indicates the degree to which neoliberalism has 
infused how Americans make sense of social issues and may 
be a side effect of an increasingly corporate-sponsored gay 
rights movements (Duggan 2004; Ghaziani 2008; Ward 
2008). The free market and capitalism are seen as arbiters of 
justice, ensuring both that business owners who would dis-
criminate against gays and lesbians would suffer appropriate 
consequences (according to those who oppose legislation) 
and that gays and lesbians would have ample outlets to secure 
whatever provisions they were seeking (according to those 
who support legislation). Supporters of religious freedom 
laws who focus on business owners’ rights showcases the 
value they place on business and capitalism. This may explain 
why researchers recently found that 53 percent of Americans 
support a business owner denying services to a gay couple, 
regardless of whether the reason for denying service was 
because of the business owner’s religious beliefs (Powell 
et al. 2017). Indeed, we also found that not all people who 
support religious freedom legislation specifically mentioned 
the need to protect religious freedom in their justification. 
Moreover, that those who oppose religious freedom legisla-
tion likewise upheld neoliberalism and championed the 
framework of the free market mirrors the strategy used by 
some LGBTQ rights organizations. For instance, groups such 
as the Human Rights Campaign put out an equality index that 
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ranks businesses and corporations on how LGBTQ friendly 
they are using a range of measures. Our findings support the 
observation that Americans may increasingly look to nongov-
ernmental interventions, such as the free market, to adjudicate 
matters of discrimination and equality with regard to religious 
freedom (see Duggan 2004; Levitsky 2014).
Ultimately, the fact that people on both sides of the 
debates over religious freedom laws appeal to frameworks 
that resonate with nearly all Americans to justify their posi-
tion underscores why these bills will likely continue to be 
introduced, debated, and seen as controversial, despite the 
fact that polling data suggests that a majority of Americans 
may actually be opposed to some of what such bills codify 
into law.
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